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Professor Dr. Norbert Walter**
I. INTRODUCTION
Jacques Delores, President of the EC-Commission, once referred to the
completion of the single European market as a "silent" revolution.
Compared to the fundamental reforms in Eastern Europe this certainly
holds true. But changes in Western Europe will be substantial as well,
since the EC 1992-project to a large extent will turn economic structures
and perceptions within the Community upside down.
II. GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS
A. Higher Growth
Higher growth will result for the Community as a whole. Private
consumers and the public-sector will benefit the most. Lower costs when
border formalities are eliminated and the opening up of the markets will
lead to more efficient production of goods and services due to stronger
competitive pressure. Lower prices will increase purchasing power
(Pigou-effect) and stimulate demand in real terms. This in turn will give
companies the chance to sell more and to make use of economies of scale.
In addition, product and process innovations will accelerate due to a
broader basis. In the medium term the competitiveness of European in-
dustry will significantly improve. This dynamic aspect, which goes be-
yond the static effects of a one-time reduction in costs, is the ultimate
economic reason for establishing the common internal market.
B. Time Profile
The time profile of these positive developments is rather vague.
Many people, particularly on the labor market, fear that the transition
period will be long and painful before the positive effects manifest them-
selves. Of course it is always much easier to identify the trouble spots
than the potential benefits because it is difficult to obtain an empirical
assessment of the advantages generated by closer market integration.
The Cecchini-Report estimates the costs of "non-Europe" at
roughly ECU 200 bn representing five percent of the European Commu-
* Speech delivered at the Kieler Woche Konferenz, June, 1989, Kiel, West Germany.
** Chief Economist, Deutsche Bank.
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nity's ("EC") gross national product ("GNP"). This figure has been mis-
interpreted. It does not necessarily mean extra growth of the EC's gross
domestic product ("GDP") rather it is the increase in the productive
capacity of the Member States.' The expansion of the productive capac-
ity which is essential for any lasting upturn in growth and employment.
This enhancement of capacity must be accompanied by a concerted
movement in economic policies toward stimulating demand. Such a
combination of supply and demand factors can increase the actual
growth rate by approximately one percentage point per annum in the
first half of the 1990s. In fact, the announcement of the EC 1992 pro-
gram already accelerated economic growth in Europe during the final
years of the eighties. In 1989, for the first time within the last ten years,
the European growth rate has exceeded the American growth rate.
Higher growth will create two million or more jobs over the medium
term. However, the Commission expects that in the first two years of the
internal market job losses will be probable, as workers and capital after
displacement face difficulties being reabsorbed in another job. This
might be true especially if the single market does not improve the flexibil-
ity of the markets. But since it is aimed at improving the flexibility of
markets and as investment and demand for skilled labor rises as a result
of the preparations for the internal market there is a good chance of
avoiding a "worsening" situation before the "final" improvement.
III. SECTORAL AND REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES
The economic consequences of completing the large internal market
will be engendered by an improvement in supply-side conditions. These
conditions are aimed at achieving a more favorable environment for pro-
duction and investment competition, and trade. The removal of the non-
tariff trade barriers means deregulation or easier market access, through-
out Europe. Therefore, the Community's plans to set up the integrated
market are in accordance with the recommendations of international or-
ganizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment ("OECD") or the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"),
which have long urged a reduction of rigidities in the European econo-
mies, greater flexibility, and more willingness to deregulate, in short
more market. EC plans are also in accordance with GATT principles of
non-discrimination, even though some transitory measures, such as for
car imports, are necessary.
Naturally, the integration of segmented national markets is going to
entail adjustment difficulties within certain sectors of the economies. It is
in this context that the question of winners and losers, referring to com-
I For more details on sectoral impacts see Institut ftir Wirtschaftsforschung Miinchen, Studien
zur Industriewirtschaft Nr. 33, Miinchen 1988.
Vol. 22:331
1992 AND BEYOND
panies as well as to branches and countries, of the 1992-program is
raised.
A. Companies
There is a widespread misconception that the internal market is to
only benefit large firms and it is true that larger groups are already well
on the way to "Europeanization." Nevertheless, the single market offers
the small and medium-sized firms the possibilities which have previously
been reserved for the big players. The abolition of border formalities and
technical barriers will make foreign business much easier and will facili-
tate the transition from a purely domestic enterprise to an export-ori-
ented company. At the same time, however, the companies will have to
prepare for more intensive competition in the domestic markets.
The single market necessitates an adjustment in corporate strategies.
This requires inter alia a review of production ranges, new distribution
and logistic systems, and the willingness to participate in cooperative
ventures. In association with the latter, the development of a new form
of "extended firm" where entities are connected by information and tech-
nology networks bringing together a variety of partners from different
nations is anticipated. Such solutions might be of greater importance for
small and medium sized firms, without much previous international ex-
perience. In any case, the single market calls for more flexibility and
creativity in companies of any size.
B. Sectors
Looking at the impact on sectors it is obvious that, first and fore-
most, those which were previously protected from competition will-now
have to reckon with increasing pressure from rivals in other partner
countries. The Commission's Ceechini-Report enlists 40 sectors out of
120, representing 50% of the industrial value added, which will have to
face severe adjustment processes. Those sectors are characterized by
four factors: 1) large price differences among the countries; 2) many
non-tariff barriers; 3) small cross-border trade; and 4) low international
competitiveness. These descriptions especially apply to service areas that
have been strongly regulated. These areas include road and air transpor-
tation, telecommunications, the insurance industry, and in some coun-
tries the banking sector. Those branches - and within the manufacturing
industry it is the majority - which are already large-scale suppliers of the
European market are less likely to be affected by the changes in the eco-
nomic environment as far as internal EC adjustments are concerned.'
To predict the distribution of gains between the countries is even
2 Id.
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more difficult. On the one hand regions that will benefit from the single
market are those which already maintain a good infrastructure and a
high share of growth-orientated service industries or "light" industries
with a modest burden on the environment. This argument gives the ex-
pectation of disproportional gain in the present centers. On the other
hand, the chance for the periphery to gain is obvious in labor and land
intensive production, thus hollowing out the industrial and agricultural
base of the centers. Therefore, the preferential advantages of the periph-
ery are in the exploitation of comparative cost advantages rather than
demanding resources from the EC such as regional and structural funds.
Spain is a good example of how the improvement of economic conditions
may work with its high attraction of foreign investment. In summary, as
the Member States start from different positions there are possible gains
from a better division of labor, with labor intensive industries moving to
the periphery and, on a limited scale, labor saving industries moving to
the center. This reallocation will improve the welfare of all in the long-
run, but will be potentially painful to some countries during the transi-
tion period. Although not all European countries will be equally af-
fected, none will lose out in comparison with a non-integration-scenario
because the single market is not going to be a "zero-sum game" in which
market shares are merely redistributed.
IV. WITHIN THE TIME SCHEDULE
Doubts are mounting regarding the Communities ability to meet its
time schedule for the completion of the single market. The EC-Commis-
sion has compiled 90% of the necessary measures listed in the White
Paper. Almost two-thirds of these measures have already been adopted
by the EC-Council of Ministers. Every time another step is taken it rein-
forces the target and certainty of achievement that adds to the cycle of
economic pressure to move ahead in the Community.
Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that the EC will encounter some
setbacks along the way. One case is in the harmonization of indirect
taxes such as VAT and excise duties. The different proposals of the Com-
mission have been refused by most of the Member States. The Commis-
sion has to find a compromise between two almost incompatible
requirements: 1) to allow for the smallest budgetary effect for each of the
Member States which would lead to a small degree of convergence; and
2) to achieve the smallest distortion of competition in the single market
which, on the contrary, would require full harmonization. A final deci-
sion has been postponed until after 1992. But if the border controls are
to disappear a compromise in time before that date is essential, otherwise
there will be a massive shift in buying from high-tax to low-tax
VCol. 22:331
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countries.
Europe will complete its internal market, perhaps not by 1992, but
certainly before the mid-90s. Market forces are driving at it and political
strategies are reinforcing it. Industry is now planning and reorganizing
on the basis of an integrated market. A lot of money is currently being
invested in 1992. This indicates that the idea has developed so much
momentum on its own that, notwithstanding political problems, the com-
pletion of the single market may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
V. FRAmEWORK OF THE SINGLE MARKET
Aside from the measures mentioned in the White Paper there are a
few that are politically essential preconditions to the realization of the
potential welfare gains of the single market. The first is a liberal trade
policy. As with any regional trade integration, the promotion of trade
within this area leads to the displacement of trade somewhere in the rest
of the world; trade diversion. In this sense, a certain negative impact on
non-EC-countries is hardly avoidable. Even though the natural way to
reduce such an effect is to replace trade in goods by capital mobility,
which has already been done by an increasing number of non-EC-compa-
nies, as rising foreign investment in the Community shows, it is abso-
lutely necessary to keep borders open not only within the EC but also vis-
a-vis third countries. Some Member States still believe it is necessary to
account for the adjustment pressure the single market imposes on them
by applying restrictions on imports from third countries. The imports of
Japanese cars are an appropriate example in this regard. But experience
shows the protection of industry has not resulted in higher efficiency. On
the contrary, the gains in efficiency and the entrepreneurial spirit in those
industries have always been very remote and the welfare losses for the
rest of the economy have been high.4 Therefore, the Community would
relinquish much of the expected prosperity benefits if the single market
were only realized at the cost of higher protection against imports
outside the community. This is one reason why the EC-Commission has
been reluctant to decide on binding directives on trade policy.
The single market will also bring advantages to companies from
third countries. Europe is the world's most important region for interna-
tional trade, well ahead of the United States and Japan. The EC is also
the world's largest importer. Therefore, the expected growth stimulus
from the single market will have an immediate world-wide impact. An-
other positive impact on nations outside the EC will be that a harmo-
nized Europe will enlarge opportunities for third country companies
3 For business implications of fiscal harmonization see 1992 - Myths & Realities, CENTER FOR
BUSINESS STRATEGY (London Business School, 1989).
4 See Hugo Dicke, EG-Politik auf dem Pruefstand, Kieler Studien Nr. 209, Tuebingen 1987.
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since they, like any firm from within the EC, can supply the EC market
with uniform products, under unified rules.
The second prerequisite for the successful completion of the unified
market is a firm and coherent competition policy tailored to the dimen-
sions of a single market. Again, as in the discussion on trade policy,
some countries tend to mix up industrial policy and competition policy.
Opinions are divided over whether the main emphasis should be on en-
hancing competition or on facilitating industrial rationalization through
EC-wide and national mergers. Germany clearly prefers competition
over industrial policy initiatives supposedly designed to bolster the com-
petitiveness of specific companies or sectors. The fact that the proposal
of the EC-Commission on crossfrontier acquisitions and mergers has
taken almost sixteen years of discussion before a compromise could be
found at the end of last year is a reflection of these divergent attitudes.
The third issue is the so called "social dimension" of the single mar-
ket. Several Member States feel it is necessray to harmonize the security
regulations and wage policies in order to support the adjustment
processes within the Community. But this institutional approach would
reduce flexibility which is necessary to successfully promote structural
change. Wage differentials in the Community have to be conceded in
order to allow countries like Spain and Portugal to maintain and improve
their economic competitiveness and close the gap between the richer and
poorer EC Member States.
VI. PROGRESS IN THE FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
More than one-third of the estimated welfare gains of the single
market are expected from the liberalization of the financial markets
where average cost or price reductions of ten percent are believed to be
possible. The Cecchini-Report concludes that the liberalization of finan-
cial services in the EC will, in the medium term, enable the GDP to rise
by 1.5%.'
Even though this may be somewhat optimistic the financial sector is
undoubtedly a key element of the infrastructure and its quality is a cru-
cial factor in determining the strength of the European economy. In fact,
banks and insurance companies have been outgrowing the rest of the
economy for quite some time; recent statistics put their share of the Com-
munity's GDP at seven percent a share and it is likely to increase in the
future.
For the German banks that are already involved in European and
international business the starting position appears to be relatively
favorable. One reason is the strong position of the German economy
5 REPORT ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, COMMIT-
TEE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, Luxembourg (1989).
Vol. 22:331
1990] 1992 AND BEYOND 337
within the EC. Its share of the GNP of the twelve Member States is
more than one quarter. Another reason is that Germany profits from the
international importance of the Bundesbank. In particular, it profits
from its dominating role in the European Monetary System ("EMS").
The fact that this view is shared by others is reflected by the strong influx
of foreign banks. In Frankfurt alone there are almost 250 foreign banks
compared with roughly 150 German institutions.
This is an indication of the traditional openness of the German
banking market. Therefore, it can be expected that Europe 1992 will not
confront German banks with any major competitive "shocks" since they
are used to living with a high degree of competition.
Another reason the position of Germany is dynamic going into 1992
is in the strength of the German stocks and bonds market. Their turno-
ver came third in the world-league in 1988, after Tokyo and New York.
Nevertheless, the market capitalization on the German stock exchanges
is low in the international arena. It goes without saying that London is,
at present, the only financial center in Europe of the same importance as
New York and Tokyo. Undoubtedly, however, the financial centers on
the European Continent will gain in importance in case the United King-
dom keeps its reservations against European monetary integration.
Frankfurt would then have a chance to become number one in the single
European market.
Steps have been taken to improve the international standing of Ger-
many's financial market. The Germans led the well-known British mag-
azine "The Economist" to talk about a "modest revolution" in the
Federal Republic. Its beginnings go back to the so-called "residual liber-
alization" when in the spring of 1985 new capital market instruments
such as zero bonds, floating rate notes, and dual currency bonds were
admitted in Germany. Further steps have been taken in the last few
years. The abolition of the ten percent withholding tax in mid-1989 was
a clear sign that the government of the Federal Republic saw the need to
improve the German financial market position within the single Euro-
pean market. Another important example was the initiative to establish
a German options and futures exchange. It was operating by the begin-
ning of 1990. Investors in the Federal Republic are now able to hedge
their portfolios using financial futures and options.
All this means that the prospects for the German banks to do busi-
ness on their home market are improving. For German banks it is
equally important, that Europe 1992 will open up additional fields of
business. For banks in particular the single market is a great challenge.
It is a great challange because first, they have to support companies and
consumers in the new surroundings by consulting them and financing
new ventures. Second, the regulatory environment for the banks them-
selves will change. Despite some details still to be resolved, one can say
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that the structures of the EC financial market are becoming much clearer
than those of other areas of the single market.
The free and unfettered financial EC-market will be based on three
prerequisites:
- the elimination of all capital controls;
- the right to sell financial services across borders; and
- the complete freedom of establishment for the suppliers of finan-
cial services.
Thanks to the new dynamism in integration policy, a number of steps
toward satisfying these requirements have already been taken or are be-
ing prepared.
Of particular significance in this context is the directive on the com-
plete liberalization of capital movements in the Community by mid-1990
with longer transition periods for Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland.
Some basic changes in banking law in the EC are also under way. The
EC directive on a bank's own capital has recently been adopted and the
Second Banking Directive was passed by the Council of Ministers.6 Ger-
many is satisfied that the Commission's original proposal, which was a
rather rigid and potentially protectionist instrument, has been removed.
It met heavy criticism not only from American banks, but also from the
British, Dutch, and German governments. The new revised proposals
are more liberal and more workable. It now appears that reciprocity will
be used as a weapon of last resort only to gain equal access for European
banks in third countries.
Despite some criticism the German banks can be content with the
changes being brought about by EC banking law. The Second Banking
Directive allowing the full scope of universal banking under one roof is
very important to them. That means they can offer their broad range of
services to private and corporate customers all over Europe; new oppor-
tunities are waiting to be tapped. However, care must be taken to ensure
that the planned Directives on specialized securities houses will not lead
to a competitive disadvantage of the universal banks' investment banking
business. Generally, the EC-Commission should apply to the principle of
"same business - same risk - same rules."
VII. CONCLUSION
The completion of the single market is not the end of the road. The
smooth functioning of a Europe without frontiers will depend on an even
greater coordination of economic and monetary policies as formally in-
6 COM(87) 715 final, Feb. 23, 1988, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 84) 1 (1988) (Proposal For a
Second Council Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions
Relating to the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Direc-
tive 77/780/EEC).
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cluded in the Single European Act. If the EC is to achieve a truly dy-
namic and integrated financial market, it will have to deal with a number
of difficult issues. First is the task of broadening the membership of the
EMS where invitations to join have been constantly refused (Pound Ster-
ling) and the task of choosing new EC-members among those that are
anxious to join the EMS at least by 1992. The second question is
whether to create a European central bank and a European common
currency.
There is no doubt that even with the single market and well-func-
tioning EMS trade, 1992 will still be hampered by currency risks as well
as transaction costs and will be distorted by divergent cost and price de-
velopments due to diverging macro-policies. The full benefits of a single
European market will not be forthcoming unless there is a common Eu-
ropean currency designed to pre-empt recurrent exchange rate fluctua-
tions and a possible relapse into exchange rate controls.
The report of the Delors Committee proposes a number of practical
steps on the way toward monetary union.7 The main preconditions for a
monetary union with a European central bank ("ECB") have been
agreed upon. The report states that:
- the ECB should be independent from political institutions;
- the system would be committed to the objective of price stability;
- it would have a federate structure since this would correspond best
to the political diversity of the Community; and
- monetary financing of budget deficits should not be allowed.
The report does not give a deadline as to when the proposed series of
steps should be implemented. However, at the last summit in December,
1989 the politicians decided to start with the first stage of increased insti-
tutionalized consultations for the monetary union in July, 1990. Still, the
attitudes of the Member States toward the goal of a monetary union
cover a wide range, from complete rejection to enthusiastic reception.
That some countries have reacted with reserve, to say the least, is not
surprising since the autonomy of national institutions is at stake here. By
definition, there can be no independent monetary policy in a currency
union. Instead, with much of the ability of conducting an independent
monetary policy gone a growing role of fiscal policy is perceived. In
principle, fiscal policy's independence is preserved in the new regime. In
practice, however, fiscal policy is likely to be restricted especially in
countries with high deficits, such as Italy. Therefore, the decisive ques-
tion is whether the governments are prepared to surrender sovereignty to
a supranational institution. Quite a few doubts still exist concerning this
surrender of sovereign power.
7 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE "COST OF NoNEURoPE" IN FINAN-
CIAL SERVICE, (Luxemburg 1988).
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Monetary union is a long-term goal rather than something to be
settled by the end of 1992. On the other hand, EC governments and
central banks may soon understand that most of the national sovereignty
has already become an illusion. Open borders for goods and capital are
inconsistent with divergent national policies if recurring and divergent
capital flows are to be avoided. Thus, steps to monetary union are less
revolutionary than originally perceived.
The repercussions of the single European market go far beyond any
assessment of the direct effects of the measures set forth in the White
Paper. The incidental pressure of the Single European Act will have a
potentially enormous effect. 1992 is a grand scale European-style supply-
side program; it looks as though it could set the ball rolling for the re-
structuring of firms, branches, and economies on a continental scale and
by doing so improve European and worldwide welfare.
